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Abstract: As current policy frameworks are expiring soon, the EU is revisiting 
its energy technology policy for the post-2020 horizon. The main long-run 
objective for energy technology policy is to foster the achievement of 
ambitious EU goals for decarbonisation. We discuss how European energy 
technology policy towards 2050 can be effective despite: 1) uncertain carbon 
prices; 2) uncertain technological change; and 3) uncertain or alternating policy 
paradigms shifting the focus from decarbonisation towards competitiveness or 
energy supply security. Public support to innovation in energy technologies is 
needed to correct for market failures and imperfections, as well as to fully 
exploit trade opportunities of such technologies on global markets. Benefits 
from EU intervention can be expected from the coordination of national 
policies. Effective European technology push should put strong emphasis on 
pushing consumption-oriented and enabling technologies, as these offer a  
no-regret strategy vis-à-vis any future context. 
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1 Motivation 
In 2009, the European Council agreed on the long-term EU climate policy goal to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions inside the EU to at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. 
Achieving this goal poses significant challenges for EU policy makers. Most low-carbon 
energy technologies are not yet competitive or even not technologically proven. 
Moreover, the current period of austerity has imposed tight constraints on national 
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budgets and has forced governments to rethink fiscal policies, including support for 
research and innovation. Different Member States have recently abandoned several 
expensive energy policies, mostly those promoting clean energy technologies. Current 
policy frameworks on the European level are running out, such as the Strategic Energy 
Technology Plan (SET Plan) and the EU has to establish a lasting policy framework that 
fosters the achievement of its ambitious commitments for decarbonisation by 2050. 
In the light of these recent developments, this article discusses how European energy 
technology policy towards 2050 can be effective despite: 
1 uncertain carbon prices 
2 uncertain technological change 
3 uncertain or alternating policy paradigms shifting the focus from decarbonisation 
towards competitiveness or energy supply security. 
We first argue that public support to innovation in low-carbon technologies is needed  
to correct for market failures and imperfections, as well as to fully exploit trade 
opportunities of such technologies on global markets. Benefits from EU intervention can 
be expected from the coordination of national policies, and European co-funding also  
can leverage additional national and private funds. We finally argue that European 
technology push – to offer a feasible no-regret strategy vis-à-vis uncertain energy market 
and political developments on the way to 2050 – should strongly emphasise pushing 
consumption-oriented and enabling technologies. 
This article is organised as follows. Section 2 derives the origins of and the 
justification for technology push and illustrates benefits from EU involvement and 
European co-funding of innovation. Section 3 introduces the three major sources of 
uncertainties that policymakers have to take account of when designing a future energy 
technology policy. Having these uncertainties in mind, Section 4 derives a robust and 
feasible policy, with respect to its design and technology-specific content. Section 5 
concludes. 
2 Rationales for European technology push 
Policy intervention needs to be justified in terms of its economic or social benefits. To 
this end, this section establishes rationales for public support to low-carbon innovation as 
well as for EU involvement in this respect. Finally, this section briefly discusses the 
effectiveness of currently implemented European technology push. 
2.1 Rationales for technology push 
As discussed in-depth in Ruester et al. (2013), policy intervention in research, 
development, demonstration and deployment (RDD&D) of low-carbon energy 
technologies can be motivated by market failures on the one hand, or by strategic 
industry and trade policy issues on the other. First, the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions is a global public good and unless such reduction is adequately rewarded, or 
emissions properly charged, the incentive to develop and deploy low-carbon technologies 
will be too low, see also Stern (2006). Second, research activities are accompanied by 
positive externalities from knowledge spillovers and without a restrictive access regime, 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    A strategic energy technology policy towards 2050 163    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
innovating firms cannot fully appropriate their returns, reducing innovation efforts below 
socially optimal levels, see Martin and Scott (2000) and Foxon (2003). Third, capital 
markets suffer from information asymmetries among innovators and investors. Many 
investors are constrained in equity and debt capital, not only due to the limited 
availability of funds as a result of the financial crisis, but also since certain types of 
(especially small or new) actors face difficulties to raise available funds, see Hyytinen 
and Toivanen (2005). Last, policy intervention may relate to strategic industry and trade 
policy, pushing or protecting certain technologies and industries on the global market. 
Different policy instruments aim at taking account of each of the above mentioned 
rationales. Market pull instruments, such as carbon pricing schemes or payments 
subsidising the deployment of certain technologies like the widely implemented national 
renewable support schemes, mainly address the positive externalities of clean energy 
production. In contrast, technology push mainly targets the correction of spillover effects 
accompanying the innovation process. Besides monetary transfers, technology push 
might also shift financial risks from entrepreneurs to public authorities by guaranteeing 
financial support in case research does not turn out to be successful or scalable for market 
implementation. Thus, technology push can also address capital market imperfections 
and, in case of a strong push, technology performance on the world market. 
To shed light on the financial parameters that justify technology push, Figure 1 
depicts a simplified illustration of the innovation chain and characterises each step in 
terms of its investment needs and types of risks and returns. Whereas technical risks are 
dominant in the very early stages of the innovation chain and innovators’ main concern is 
the financing of the research activities, political and commercial risks become more 
relevant as technologies evolve along the chain. 
Figure 1 Simplified innovation chain 
Basic research Research & 
development
Demonstration Commerciali‐
zation
Deployment
Typically smaller investments Typically huge investments
Technical  risks Market risksTechnical & political risks
No returns Commercial returnsRisky returns
Technology push
Market pull
Simplified 
innovation chain
Relative 
importance of 
technology push  
There is a consensus in energy technology policy literature that market pull alone does 
not lead to the desired outcomes. Instead, a well-designed policy involves pull to deal 
with the environmental externality, and, at the same time, complementary technology 
push to deal with the knowledge and spillover externalities, see Horbach (2007) or Nemet 
(2009). As concluded in Grubb (2004), the relative importance of technology push to 
market pull increases as one moves from technologies close to market competitiveness 
towards highly immature ones. Especially the central stages of the value chain, 
commercial-scale demonstration and early deployment, involve substantial investment 
needs accompanied by still non-negligible risks. This ‘valley of death’, where the key 
challenge is the transition from publicly co-financed to private operations, is discussed 
in-depth elsewhere, see Murphy and Edwards (2003) and Weyant (2011). 
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2.2 Rationales for EU involvement 
Policy intervention and corresponding policy instruments can be governed by the EU, 
jointly coordinated among countries, or by individual Member States who seek to 
intervene mainly on their home market. Nonetheless, the challenges are (at least) of 
European nature, with externalities and spillovers being phenomena that cross national 
borders. Therefore, relying only on individual Member State action is likely to lead to 
sub-optimal outcomes. 
From an institutional perspective, there are shared competences between Member 
States and the EU regarding the achievement of the European environmental and energy 
policy goals (Art. 192 and 194, Treaty of the Functioning of the EU) as well as related to 
actions that ensure the conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the European 
industry (Art. 173). As for technology push, it is thus necessary to investigate whether 
there are substantial economic benefits to be gained from EU involvement, but at the 
same time to set those benefits into relation with the costs of pooling public regulatory 
power at this highest political level: 
Benefits from EU intervention can be expected from the coordination of national 
policies. The currently implemented bottom-up approach with the 20-20-20 targets1  
being specified in EU Directives (2009/28/EC; 2009/29/EC and accompanying Decision 
406/2009/EC; 2012/27/EC) that have to be implemented into national laws, resulted in a 
wide set of national policy instruments and support programs. Technology push initiated 
at the EU level, in contrast, can avoid an unnecessary duplication of national or regional 
initiatives. A common EU funding scheme can also avoid that Member States only fund 
technologies being produced within their own borders and free-ride on third countries to 
push other technologies. Besides, different studies show that European co-funding can 
leverage substantial additional national and private funds, see EC (2011b) or Liljelund  
et al. (2011). Moreover, most of the Member States simply are too small to implement 
certain instruments or to compete on a global scale with economies such as the USA or 
China. When joint action is taken, technology but also industry and trade policies are 
more credible towards world market competitors, while also being more credible for 
attracting foreign investment. And also for overcoming the financial crisis and relaxing 
funding constraints, the EU has to play its role, as the financial crisis clearly is a 
European problem calling for European solutions. 
Following the principle of subsidiarity, EU action, however, shall only be taken when 
it is more effective than actions at national, regional, or local level. Potential drawbacks 
of EU involvement might be the disregard of national specificities, the reduction  
of institutional competition between alternative policy approaches, and the loss of 
decentralised ‘willingness to do more’. Considering the above arguments in favour of EU 
intervention, it can be conjectured that they outweigh their costs for some policy areas 
where strong coordination is needed (such as the EU ETS). However, at the same time 
when EU regulations become themselves complex and alien to national habits, also 
transaction costs increase and might outweigh the benefits of EU intervention. In  
Section 4, we will discuss the importance of recognising the subsidiarity principle and 
transaction costs with respect to prioritising technologies that are to be pushed on the 
European level. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    A strategic energy technology policy towards 2050 165    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
2.3 Status quo of currently implemented European technology push 
As pointed out above, a mix of technology push and market pull instruments dominates 
relying on just one class of instrument and in the EU indeed a mix of both instruments 
prevails. In this respect technology push has to be evaluated in the context of 
implemented market pull. 
The main market pull instrument is the EU-wide emission trading scheme (EU ETS) 
which was introduced in 2003 and substantially strengthened with the 2009 climate and 
energy policy package.2 The EU ETS is accompanied by a broad spectrum of national 
measures supporting the deployment of low-carbon technologies, see Ecofys et al. 
(2011). These measures aim at achieving the binding national targets for the share of 
renewable energy sources in gross final energy consumption by 2020 and follow an 
approach of indirect promotion for low-carbon technologies through guaranteeing certain 
revenue streams in addition to the market value of low-carbon technologies. 
Complementary technology push offers the direct promotion of low-carbon 
technologies. At the European level, for this sake, the SET Plan has been adopted in 2008 
as the so called ‘technology pillar’ of the EU energy and climate policy. Industrial 
Initiatives bring together industry, the research community, Member States and the 
Commission. Strategic objectives have been formulated based on a set of technology 
roadmaps that identify priority actions for different technology sectors, such as wind 
energy, solar PV and CSP, or biomass, for the decade from 2010 to 2020. More specific 
implementation plans, containing more detailed descriptions of proposed RDD&D 
activities, as well as suggestions about potential funding sources, are developed regularly 
for three-year periods. However, the current SET Plan has a limited time horizon, 
expiring in 2020. In addition, all planning and priority setting is conducted within the 
individual industrial initiatives, and thus, it does not necessarily support an optimal  
(cost-efficient) portfolio of low-carbon technologies, i.e., decarbonisation at least cost. 
Technology push in the form of direct support to innovation can involve a whole set 
of financing instruments including not only research grants but also low-interest loans 
and loan guarantees, public equity, technology prizes, et cetera. As concluded in Olmos 
et al. (2012), such instruments are indeed policy instruments. In addition to their function 
of closing the gap between the cost of innovation and funds private parties are willing to 
contribute, they might be able to target specific technologies and types of innovating 
entities. Current practice shows that subsidies in the form of grants and contracts – the 
most attractive form of support from the innovators’ perspective, but also the most 
expensive one for the public sector – are, by far, the preferred policy instruments to fund 
clean energy innovation of any type. 
Recent policy initiatives already are a first step towards a ‘smarter’ financing  
support. The European Energy Efficiency Fund is a public-private partnership offering 
different types of debt and equity instruments to projects dedicated to energy efficiency, 
small-scale renewables and clean urban transport projects. The Risk Sharing Finance 
Facility has been jointly developed by the Commission and the EIB to co-finance  
higher-risk R&D involving complex products and technologies, or being subject to 
unproven markets and intangible assets. Support of up to EUR 300 mn per project is 
primarily provided in the form of loans and loan guarantees and some equity financing 
coming from the European Investment Fund. The Horizon 2020 program will include 
output-based funding such as technology prizes. Loan and equity financing are expected 
to play a greater role, too. 
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3 Sources of uncertainty for designing optimal technology push 
Best practice for technology push will depend on the overall energy policy context. This 
context is uncertain, with uncertainty originating from three sources: the adequateness of 
the carbon price signal, the set of available decarbonisation technologies, and potential 
paradigm shifts in EU energy policy away from decarbonisation. As discussed below, 
consequences of these uncertainties might call for an even stronger technology push than 
today. 
3.1 Uncertain carbon prices 
The policy context for (European) technology push is defined by market pull regimes, 
and here foremost by the EU ETS and the adequateness of the carbon price signal. Today, 
it can be heavily doubted that based on the current scheme and the currently determined 
emission cap, carbon prices in the magnitude of those reported in different EU Energy 
Roadmap scenarios3 can be implemented. One can expect severe difficulties to 
implement a ‘high-enough’, adequate carbon price and also to include more types of 
greenhouse gas emissions into the scheme. Obviously, some sectors are more affected 
than others, as will be the case for different EU Member States, see Delgado (2007)  
and Ellerman et al. (2010). Especially countries being specialised in carbon-intensive 
products most likely will oppose a strong carbon pricing scheme and will advocate 
exemptions for individual sectors or the free allocation of emission allowances to certain 
user groups, a scenario that is even more relevant with the current EU and financial crises 
raising the question whether such a policy would be affordable for all Member States. 
The recent rejection by the European Parliament of the back-loading proposal further 
decreases the chances that sufficiently tight emission caps will be introduced soon, and it 
is open whether as a result individual Member States might follow the British example. 
The UK Government in 2011 unilaterally introduced a carbon price floor of GBP 16/ton, 
following a linear path up to GBP 30/ton in 2020, see House of Commons (2013). 
In summary, given the current absence of a strong enough carbon price, together with 
the necessity to accelerate low-carbon innovation, as highlighted in Kemfert and 
Schumacher (2005), Stern (2006) or Aghion et al. (2009), the need for technology push 
further gains in importance. 
3.2 Technological shocks 
The EU Energy Roadmap scenarios build on a menu of essentially known technologies. 
In 2050, the energy system will likely be extremely different than it is today. 
Nonetheless, the optimal portfolio of decarbonisation technologies has a very long time 
horizon, not only looking ahead to the 2050 target, but technological lock-ins will  
persist even beyond. But it is not only this very long-term nature inherent in the  
path dependency of technology development. Also recent events, such as the Fukushima 
accident, influence possible future market environments. For instance, a ‘2050 bridging 
role’ was still given to nuclear in the first version of the German energy strategy in late 
2010, whereas the country announced a nuclear phase out until 2022 only one year later 
as a response to the Fukushima accident. 
Possible shocks might not only eliminate technology options, but could also add new 
means of decarbonisation. Whereas the International Energy Agency in its World Energy 
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Outlook 2007 (when the 20-20-20 strategy was adopted by the European Council) 
predicted a moderate growth for US gas production and did not mention shale gas at all, 
the World Energy Outlook 2011 is talking about a possible ‘golden age of gas’. A (more 
global) shale gas revolution may severely shake up our today’s EU energy strategy: The 
production of shale gas, an unconventional gas resource, rose from less than 1% of 
domestic gas production in the USA in 2000 to over 20% in 2010. Forecasts predict a 
continuous rise up to more than 45% by 2035, see Stevens (2012). This recent 
development transformed the gas market into a buyers’ market and several experts see a 
huge potential for shale gas worldwide.4 
Assuming that the USA will become a large-scale exporter of cheap gas and that it is 
possible to replicate the American experience in other parts of the world, the availability 
of cheap gas on the market would allow for a certain degree of decarbonisation at low 
cost (or even net benefits). Hence, the ‘rational’ price of carbon might well fall extremely 
low under the push of shale gas as a ‘market-based’ decarbonisation technology. 
Nevertheless, gas is still a fossil fuel and the 2050 decarbonisation objective cannot be 
reached with shifting to gas alone. Shale gas may not only substitute for dirty coal but 
also for expensive renewables, and the lack of a carbon price signal will inhibit 
investments into the development and deployment of alternative low-carbon 
technologies. 
In summary, 2050 is a very long-term horizon and technological shocks and 
revolutions can have important, unpredictable impacts on the available set of and relative 
cost of decarbonisation technologies. There are not only substantial uncertainties 
regarding viable decarbonisation technologies within the context of the EU Energy 
Roadmap, but there are also possible futures not yet recognised in 2050 roadmaps. 
Hence, also technology push strategies that do not take account of technological 
breakthroughs or political barriers to technology deployment are likely to be ineffective. 
3.3 Paradigm shifts in EU energy policy 
Decarbonisation has become a central theme on the political agenda of European energy 
policy. Energy policy, however, traditionally builds upon three fundamental pillars: 
sustainability and competitiveness and supply security. Shifts of policy focus towards 
one or the other of these three paradigms have been frequently observable in the recent 
past. Whereas in 2007 European energy policy had a strong sustainability focus, the 
Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in winter 2008/2009 and resulting gas shortages also in 
European countries reinforced discussions about the security of energy supplies. With the 
financial and economic crisis, concerns about economic growth and competitiveness of 
domestic industries were back in the centre of political discussions. 
As for shifts towards competitiveness of European firms, climate policy imposes 
asymmetric cost on the regulated agents and at least in the short-run bears the risks of 
being detrimental for economic growth. Carbon pricing increases the industry’s cost, 
which raises concerns from an economic point of view (loss in competitiveness), but also 
from an environmental perspective (carbon leakage). There is considerable debate about 
the extent of carbon leakage and policy measures mitigating this phenomenon (e.g., Clò, 
2010; Caron, 2012; Antimiani et al., 2012). But there are also considerations about 
positive interactions between decarbonisation and economic growth. Fankhauser et al. 
(2008, p.426) argue that “growth theory has long identified technical change and 
innovation as major source of economic growth” and that long-term dynamic innovation 
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effects induced by climate policies will bring about a net job creation. However, a shift in 
the European policy focus towards prioritising competitiveness would certainly not 
improve conditions for successful implementation of decarbonisation policies and further 
aggravate the implementation of carbon pricing schemes with adequate price signals. 
Technology push in such a context clearly gains in importance. 
As for shifts in favour of supply security, at first sight, there seems to be a certain 
conflict with the achievement of environmental objectives, in particular CO2 mitigation, 
since these restrictions may limit options of energy supply. A balanced portfolio ensuring 
a well-diversified supply mix again might call for stronger push policies. But climate 
policies can induce a broader use of low-carbon technologies, and thus also have a 
positive impact on diversification. Studying the UK electricity system, Grubb et al. 
(2006) find that the introduction of an emission target of 60% will lead to a substantial 
increase in diversity of generation sources (mainly driven by a declining dominance of 
gas in the fuel mix), whereas, in contrast, in the absence of any emission target, diversity 
decreases. 
4 Implications for European technology push 
Several implications for a feasible European technology push strategy arise. As shown, 
technology push is needed to account for several market failures and imperfections. 
Benefits from EU intervention can be expected from the coordination of national policies. 
In addition, existing uncertainties and possible consequences of low carbon prices, 
technological shocks or shifts in policy paradigm may even call for stronger technology 
push, if decarbonisation is to be reached by 2050. As public money for technology push 
is rather limited at the Member State but also at the European level, this section proposes 
which technology priorities offer effective no-regret push strategies. We also discuss 
international trade measures as a potential ‘regret strategy’. Lastly, we conclude on the 
optimal division of Member State and EU responsibilities when pursuing these strategies. 
4.1 No-regret strategies for technology push 
Certain low-carbon technologies can become indispensable to achieve the transition to a 
low-carbon economy and at the same time there might be reasonable concerns that, 
without extra support, they will not be developed and deployed at the necessary scale 
and/or on time. This could, in theory, for instance be the case for carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS). All scenarios of the EU Energy Roadmap contain a substantial part 
of electricity generation using this technology (between 10% in the ‘high RES’ and 33% 
in the ‘Reference’ case in 2050). Other roadmaps (ECF and McKinsey, 2010; Eurelectric, 
2011; International Energy Agency, 2012) present very similar numbers. Hence, if the 
timely deployment of CCS is a necessary precondition to achieve climate objectives, 
further support to innovation and especially demonstration projects can be justified.5 
Similar arguments also hold for other low-carbon technologies. Stronger push policies 
here would become even more relevant if the large-scale deployment of CCS turns out to 
be infeasible and/or if more Member States decide a nuclear phase-out. 
Even though without detailed cost- and technology data at hand, disaggregated 
technology-specific recommendations as to what technologies and research activities to 
push are not possible, we can draw several conclusions that will generally hold: 
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A prioritisation of low-carbon production technologies by policy makers entails  
high risks of ‘picking wrong winners’, especially so because future energy market 
developments like the evolution of shale gas production and fossil fuel prices may 
entirely change the benefits and market value of different production technologies. 
The situation is different for certain consumption-oriented technologies, comprising 
mainly energy conservation and efficiency enhancing measures. Several reasons argue 
for pushing such technologies. First, there is a consensus that the long-term EU climate 
objectives cannot be reached without substantial improvements in energy efficiency,  
see Mundaca (2008). Moreover, due to their inherent nature of being less  
manufacturing-oriented but rather to a large extent relying on installing new appliances, 
incentivising smart behaviour, et cetera, the implementation of energy conservation 
measures typically is quite labour-intensive, and, therefore, entails a larger positive effect 
on job creation. Limited labour mobility implies that new jobs are created within the EU. 
Besides, pushing consumption-oriented technologies generally does not lead to large 
biases in energy markets, as is the case for production technologies where support for 
low-carbon generation will inevitably crowd out remaining competing (and also 
incumbent) technologies and, hence, can bias market efficiency in often unanticipated 
ways. 
Hence, pushing consumption-oriented technologies dominates pushing  
production-oriented technologies in terms of both feasibility and robustness. First, the 
above arguments indicate that such push is politically feasible: Opposing to a push for 
production technologies, that often would benefit certain Member States in which the 
major suppliers are located, energy efficiency enhancing measures benefit all EU 
industries, those offering energy efficiency products and all industries applying it. Hence, 
this push strategy is independent of geographic location and creates jobs throughout  
all Member States. Second, such push is robust with respect to future energy market 
developments: Consuming less is a no-regret policy. The EU might well look after its 
own ‘energy technology and security’ revolution in consuming significantly less energy. 
For similar reasons, pushing enabling technologies (such as grids, advanced metering 
or market facilitation via ICT equipment) is a valuable strategy. As for the technology 
group discussed above, investments typically are quite domestically labour-intensive. 
However, for grid infrastructures – as for enabling technologies in general – the 
appropriate magnitude of investment will depend on the amount and type of renewable 
energy that enters the power system. The optimal system architecture also will depend on 
whether we move towards ‘European-wide energy superhighways’ with massive solar 
energy being imported from North Africa, huge amounts of offshore wind energy being 
produced in the North Sea and nuclear energy from Eastern Europe contributing to 
Western European electricity supply, or whether we move instead towards a system of 
rising local energy autonomy, featured by widespread distributed generation and demand 
response. 
4.2 Industry and trade policy as potential ‘regret strategy’ for technology push 
As mentioned above, European technology push can have its justification as a means to 
respond to fierce global competition in green-tech markets and to help to keep wealth 
within the Union. Whereas the burden to finance market pull measures always is with 
consumers and tax payers but benefits can be reaped by both domestic innovators and 
producers, but also market entrants from outside the EU, technology push can be 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   170 S. Ruester et al.    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
designed such that it explicitly favours domestic players. Targeting specific technologies 
also allows policy makers to accelerate technology development and to support industrial 
leadership. This strategy is promising especially for high-tech segments or parts of the 
value chain that cannot be outsourced to low-cost competitors. 
Industry policy can either rely on competitive forces to enable (green) growth, or 
might compromise on competition within the EU in favour of EU champions that 
compete globally. The long lasting debate just became topical once more with the recent 
EU Communication on industrial policy (EC, 2012). Trade policy measures may either 
explicitly support home technologies on global markets (via subsidies), or protect them 
from foreign competition (via import quotas or tariffs). If the EU was the first mover, the 
rationale is to shift profits from foreign to domestic firms. Early literature on strategic 
trade policy (Spencer and Brander, 1983; Krugman, 1987) finds that, if an industry is 
characterised by increasing returns to scale, subsidising home firms that then can commit 
to an increased future output, threatens the foreign firm, which will decrease its output to 
not lower market prices. Subsidies given to the home firm are outweighed by the profits 
shifted from the foreign to the home firm. Whenever the EU would have to react to such 
measures undertaken by other countries, the rationale is to sanction the first mover. 
The global market for clean technologies is huge in volume. According to Berger  
and WWF (2012), in 2011, the market volume grew by 10% to about EUR 198 bn. 
Furthermore, markets are relatively new and often not perfectly competitive. Hence, it is 
tempting for governments to engage in trade policy to push domestic firms. Current trade 
disputes related to clean technologies, however, illustrate the complexity of trade policy. 
Most prominently, China is heavily supporting its solar PV industry, leading to  
anti-dumping counter measures by the USA and the EU. Likewise, but on a smaller scale, 
Argentina is currently filing a case at the WTO, arguing that Spain was banning imports 
of biodiesel from Argentina by obliging consumers to buy biodiesel produced in Spain to 
fulfil EU targets on renewable energy. 
Such policy measures also bear considerable risk. Besides provoking counter 
measures, subsidising home technologies on the world market might lead to falling prices 
and vanishing industry profits. Within the above example, China’s aggressive industry 
policy led to a drastic fall of the world price of solar panels and hence the effectiveness of 
this policy in shifting profits can be doubted. China’s manufacturing capacity grew so 
much that an enormous oversupply was created. 
In summary, thus, it has to be noted that strategic industry- and trade policy measures 
might be possible regret measures. There is a fine line between supporting technologies 
and subsidising industries. The strong reliance on competitive forces as outlined in 
several EU Directives should be maintained. 
4.3 Division of Member State and EU responsibilities 
While especially for industry and trade policy strategies for green technologies a joint 
European approach is beneficial, the overall policy design for technology push, however, 
should rely to a large extent on bottom-up participation. Especially technology projects 
with ‘normal risk and return profiles’ are well suited to be supported by individual 
Member States, leaving high-risk support for the EU. While a bottom-up approach is 
certainly needed for national action plans and national funding, also the push coming 
from the European level will be bargained beforehand. Political considerations, such as 
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who are beneficiaries of support, will aggravate the planning and priority setting for 
technologies. 
These barriers become even larger since Member States are inhomogenous in their 
technology base and ability to finance. The economic and financial crisis has affected all 
Member States, but not all in the same way and to the same extent. Less affected 
countries, mostly in northern Europe, have entirely different starting position for 
decarbonisation policies than more affected Member States, mostly in southern Europe. 
On the one hand, there are a few countries, such as Germany or the Netherlands, which 
can benefit from relatively low financing cost, public funding opportunities and a quite 
high consumer willingness to pay for energy policy. On the other hand, there are many 
countries that suffer from extremely high financing cost, highly limited public funds, and 
consumers not willing, or able, to afford low-carbon technology support. In addition, 
low-carbon technology bases range from strong low-carbon industry positions, for e.g., 
wind energy in Germany or Denmark, or nuclear in France, to countries that do not have 
any of those or similar technology advantages yet. These differences hamper agreements 
on a unified approach for technology support. Therefore, designing an energy technology 
policy top-down is difficult to sustain, which points out the need for decentralised 
solutions co-existing to European funding and support schemes. Decentralised solutions 
further include possibilities to adapt burden sharing to national conditions and needs. 
5 Conclusions 
Currently implemented EU policies supporting innovation in low-carbon technologies are 
expiring in 2020 and today’s period of austerity has imposed tight constraints on national 
budgets and has forced governments to rethink fiscal policies, including support for 
research and innovation. This leaves the EU with the mandate to establish a clear-cut, 
post-2020 energy technology policy. The main long-run objective of such an energy 
technology policy is to foster the achievement of the ambitious decarbonisation goal for 
2050. Policy makers, however, face several sources of uncertainty, including uncertainty 
about future carbon prices, uncertainty about technological change and uncertain or 
alternating policy paradigms that might shift the focus from decarbonisation towards 
competitiveness or energy supply security. 
This article argues that public support for innovation in energy technologies is needed 
to correct for market failures and imperfections, as well as to fully exploit trade 
opportunities of such technologies on global markets. Benefits from EU intervention can 
be expected from the coordination of national policies. Regarding the choice of 
technologies to be pushed, certain low-carbon technologies can become indispensable to 
achieve the transition to a low-carbon economy and at the same time there might be 
reasonable concerns that without extra support they will not be developed and deployed 
at the necessary scale and/or on time. Moreover, for support to be robust against all 
uncertain market, technological and political developments, technology push should put 
strong emphasis on consumption-oriented and enabling technologies, as these offer  
no-regret strategies in any future context. 
Also strategic industry and trade measure could be used to push technologies on the 
world market, but have to be implemented with care, foreseeing potential reactions from 
other players and being coherent with trade regulations. There is a fine line between 
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supporting technologies and subsidising industries. The strong reliance on competitive 
forces as outlined in several EU Directives should be maintained. 
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Notes 
1 I.e., a 20% reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels; a 20% share of EU 
energy consumption produced from renewable resources; and a 20% improvement in energy 
efficiency – all by 2020. 
2 Directive 2009/29/EC considers a single EU-wide cap on emission allowances from 2013 on, 
the stepwise replacement of a free allocation by auctioning, and an enlarged list of activities 
and greenhouse gases covered. Decision 2010/634/EU sets the total EU-wide amount of 
allowances at 2,039 mn for 2013. The cap will decrease by 1.74% per year, with this factor to 
be reviewed by 2020. 
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3 Carbon prices in the underlying simulation exercises are determined such that 2050 targets are 
reached, assuming equal prices/values for ETS and non-ETS sectors. These prices range 
between 234 and 310 EUR/t, see EC (2011a). 
4 Indeed, there appear to be large quantities of technically recoverable resources. China, for 
instance, is pushing strongly the development of its potential. However, uncertainty about both 
volumes and costs persists. US companies currently produce from very large and shallow 
plays, whereas resources in other areas tend to be smaller and located in greater depths, 
increasing exploration and production costs. There is also a tendency to correct estimates on 
available volumes downward: in early 2012, Poland reduced its potential by 85% – from  
5,300 bcm to below 800 bcm. Furthermore, shale gas is produced based on horizontal drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing which involves the injection of chemicals. Severe environmental 
concerns have created strong local oppositions, and France or Bulgaria have already banned 
shale gas operations. 
5 However, as discussed elsewhere in-depth (see e.g., Hirschhausen et al., 2010), CCS can only 
thrive, if at the same time financial, political and regulatory risks are reduced. Moreover, 
public opposition, which can make the implementation of CCS projects unfeasible, is not to be 
underestimated. 
